The exclusion zone was later increased to 30 kilometres (19 mi) and an additional 68,000 people were evacuated. Russia’s Armed Forces also threatened to shut down the ZNPP if shooting continues. In response to the initial accident, a 10-kilometre (6.2 mi) radius exclusion zone was created 36 hours after the accident, from which approximately 49,000 people were evacuated, primarily from Pripyat. On 18 August, the Russian Defence Ministry claimed that a "massive provocation" could occur on 19 August, during the visit by the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, to Ukraine.
The UN urged the sides to stop military action near the ZNPP, and the international community called on Russia to leave the premises of the nuclear power plant.Starting on 5 August, attacks on ZNPP followed, with Ukraine blaming the occupying forces and Russia blaming Ukrainian defenders.
On 15 July, Ukraine’s Energoatom company stated that Russians placed missile systems at the ZNPP territory, using them to attack Nikopol. In late March, the occupiers blew up part of their ammunition on the ZNPP premises. In the early stage of the full-fledged war, Russia seized the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, and on March 4, it captured the Zaporizhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), creating risks of a radioactive disaster. Partially radioactive impurities might also spread to the neighbouring states (the eastern part of Belarus, Poland, the Baltic States).Īt the end of the simulated period, the main direction of radionuclide transport was eastward, as a result of which significant concentrations of radioactive aerosols could be observed over the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions." Significant concentrations of radionuclides could reach the city of Kyiv. "According to the results of the calculations, during 15-18 August 2022, the highest concentrations of radioactive aerosols can be observed within the territory of Ukraine, especially in the zone closest to the emission source, with a radius of 50-100 km in almost all directions from the ZNPP. We have launched English Twitter! Follow us! Given the impossibility of determining the exact characteristics of the source of emissions in the event of a hypothetical accident at the ZNPP, the results of numerical modelling should be interpreted only qualitatively and in relative terms. The following characteristics of the size distribution for radioactive aerosols were used: average diameter 1 μm, standard deviation 2 μm. Radioactive emissions are given in the form of two-point sources at heights of 200m and 500m above the earth's surface, with a total stationary power of 1 becquerels/second (0.5 Bq/s for each sources). The WRF forecast of meteorological conditions was calculated on the basis of GFS (global forecast data) with a spatial resolution of 0.5° and a time resolution of 3 hours. The results of modelling the atmospheric transfer and dispersion of radioactive Cs-137 aerosols were obtained using the Weather Research Forecasting (WRF) ARW version 4.3 forecasting meteorological model and the CALMET-CALPUFF version 6 atmospheric dispersion modelling complex.
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